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 1 What is said
*
  
François Recanati 
 
 
 
I. Levels of meaning 
 
Anyone who has reflected on the sentence meaning/utterance meaning distinction 
knows that a simple distinction is in fact insufficient. Two equally important 
distinctions must be made. 
 
• First, there is the distinction between the linguistic meaning of a sentence-type, and 
what is said (the proposition expressed) by an utterance of the sentence. For 
example, the English sentence 'I am French' has a certain meaning which, qua 
meaning of a sentence-type, is not affected by changes in the context of utterance. 
This context-independent meaning contrasts with the context-dependent propositions 
which the sentence expresses with respect to particular contexts. Thus 'I am French', 
said by me, expresses the proposition that I am French; if you utter the sentence, it 
expresses a different proposition, even though its linguistic meaning remains the 
same across contexts of use. 
 
• Second, we have the distinction between what is actually said and what is merely 
'conveyed' by the utterance. My utterance of 'I am French' expresses the proposition 
that I am French, but there are contexts in which it conveys much more. Suppose 
that, having been asked whether I can cook, I reply: 'I am French'. Clearly my 
utterance (in this context) provides an affirmative answer to the question. The 
meaning of the utterance in such a case includes more than what is literally said; it 
also includes what the utterance 'implicates'. 
 
 2  'What is said' being a term common to both distinctions, we end up with a triad: 
 
sentence meaning 
vs. 
what is said 
vs. 
what is implicated. 
 
The distinguishing characteristic of sentence meaning (the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence-type) is that it is conventional and context-independent. Moreover, in general 
at least, it falls short of constituting a complete proposition, i.e. something truth-
evaluable. In contrast, both 'what is said' and 'what is implicated' are context-dependent 
and propositional. The difference between 'what is said' and 'what is implicated' is that 
the former is constrained by sentence meaning in a way in which the implicatures are 
not. What is said results from fleshing out the meaning of the sentence (which is like a 
semantic 'skeleton') so as to make it propositional. The propositions one can arrive at 
through this process of 'fleshing out' are constrained by the skeleton which serves as 
input to the process. Thus 'I am French' can express an indefinite number of 
propositions, but the propositions in question all have to be compatible with the 
semantic potential of the sentence. That is why the English sentence 'I am French' 
cannot express the proposition that kangaroos have tails. There is no such constraint on 
the propositions which an utterance of the sentence can communicate through the 
mechanism of implicature. Given enough background, an utterance of 'I am French' 
might implicate that kangaroos have tails. What's implicated is implicated by virtue of 
an inference, and the inference chain can (in principle) be as long and involve as many 
background assumptions as one wishes.  
 The basic triad can be mapped back onto the simple sentence meaning/utterance 
meaning distinction by grouping together two of the three levels. There are two ways to 
do it, corresponding to two interpretations for the triad. The first interpretation stresses 
the close connection between sentence meaning and what is said; together, sentence 
 3 meaning and what is said constitute the literal  meaning of the utterance as opposed to 
what the speaker means: 
 
    sentence meaning 
literal meaning  
    what is said 
 
  vs. 
 
speaker's meaning 
 
The other interpretation stresses the commonality between what is said and what is 
implicated, both of which are taken to be pragmatically determined: 
 
sentence meaning 
 
 vs. 
    what is said 
speaker's meaning 
    what is implicated 
 
Essential to this interpretation is the claim that 'what is said', though constrained by the 
meaning of the sentence, is not as tightly constrained as is traditionally thought. 
 
II. Minimalism vs. Maximalism 
 
Minimalism 
 
The first interpretation corresponds to a widespread doctrine which I call pragmatic 
Minimalism. According to that doctrine, 'what is said' departs from the meaning of the 
sentence (and incorporates contextual elements) only when the sentence itself sets up a 
slot to be contextually filled. Thus an indexical sentence such as 'He is tall' does not 
 4 express a complete proposition unless a referent has been contextually assigned to the 
demonstrative pronoun 'he', which acts like a free variable in need of contextual 
instantiation. What I call 'saturation' is the contextual process whereby the meaning of 
such a sentence is completed and made propositional. Other contextual processes — 
e.g. the inference process that generates implicatures — are semantically optional. They 
enrich the meaning of the utterance but are not directly triggered by an expression in 
the sentence, hence they may take place or not according to context. According to 
Minimalism, those extra constituents of meaning which correspond to nothing in the 
sentence itself are external to what is said. 
 As an illustration, consider examples (1) to (3): 
 
(1)  I've had breakfast 
(2)  You are not going to die 
(3) The policeman stopped John's car 
 
Arguably, the first sentence, 'I've had breakfast', expresses the proposition that the 
speaker has had breakfast before the time of utterance — a proposition which, strictly 
speaking, would be true if the speaker had had breakfast only once, twenty years ago 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 189-90). That is clearly not what the speaker means when 
she answers the question 'Do you want something to eat' and replies 'I've had breakfast'; 
she means something much more specific, namely that she's had breakfast that 
morning. This aspect of speaker's meaning, however, has to be construed as external to 
what is said and as being merely conveyed, in the same way in which the utterer of 'I 
am French' implies, but does not say, that he is a good cook. That is so because nothing 
in the sentence itself constrains us to go beyond the 'minimal' interpretation, to the 
effect that the speaker's life was not entirely breafkastless. Nothing in the sentence itself 
forces us to bring in the implicit reference to a particular time. (Indeed we can easily 
imagine contexts in which a speaker would use the same sentence to assert the minimal 
proposition and nothing more.) 
 5  The same thing holds even more clearly for the second example. Kent Bach, to 
whom it is due, imagines a child crying because of a minor cut and her mother uttering 
(2) in response. What is meant is: 'You're not going to die from that cut'. But literally 
the utterance expresses the proposition that the kid will not die tout court — as if he or 
she was immortal. The extra element contextually provided (the implicit reference to 
the cut) does not correspond to anything in the sentence itself, hence it does not 
constitute a component of what is said in the minimalist sense. Again, we can easily 
imagine a context in which the same sentence would be used to communicate the 
minimal proposition and nothing more. 
 In the third example, we spontaneously interpret the utterance in a certain way, 
but if we learnt that the policeman was actually driving John's car in the reported scene 
we would understand his stopping of the car very differently from the way we 
understand it when we assume that the policeman is regulating the traffic. Quite 
different 'manners of stopping' are involved in the two cases. Those implied manners of 
stopping are part of the way we understand the utterance but they are additional aspects 
of the interpretation, linguistically optional hence external to what is said by minimalist 
standards. What is said in the minimal sense is only that the policeman stopped the car 
in some way or other. (This is in contrast to the relation between John and the car: that 
relation must be fixed for the phrase 'John's car' to have a determinate semantic value.)  
 
Maximalism 
 
Opposed to Minimalism is pragmatic Maximalism. According to that view, the relevant 
distinction is not between mandatory and optional contextual processes, but between 
those that are 'primary' and those that are 'secondary' (Recanati 1993). 
 Secondary pragmatic processes are inferential processes. They take 'what is said' 
(or the speaker's saying it) as input and yield further propositions as output. The 
Gricean reasoning by means of which conversational implicatures are worked out is a 
typical secondary process. It goes something like this: 'The speaker has said that p; he 
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in order to derive the implicit from the explicit in this manner, we need to have first 
identified the explicit content of the utterance — what is said. It is in saying that p that 
the speaker implies that q: implying presupposes saying, hence nothing can be implied 
unless something has been said, the saying of which carries the relevant implications. 
— In contrast, primary pragmatic processes are contextual processes that help 
determine what is said, but they do not presuppose that what is said has been already 
determined. 'Saturation' is a typical primary pragmatic process. 
 Now I claim that among primary pragmatic processes there are, beside 
saturation (which is mandatory), optional processes such as 'free enrichment'. (Free 
enrichment is the optional contextual process which I take to be at work in the 
interpretation of examples [1]-[3] above). In other words, not all optional processes 
need to be thought of as secondary, on the model of the Gricean reasoning which yields 
conversational implicatures. My claim rests on a distinction between two sorts of 
optional, non-minimalist processes: those that are truly inferential and presuppose that 
what is said has been previously identified, and others which are more associative. I 
cannot argue for that distinction here (see Recanati 1995). Let me simply point out that 
the notion of 'what is said' we need to capture the input to secondary, inferential 
processes already incorporates contextual elements of the optional variety. In the first 
two examples above, the speaker implies various things by saying what she does: she 
implies that she is not hungry, or that the cut is not serious. Those implicatures can be 
worked out only if the speaker is recognized as expressing the proposition that she's had 
breakfast that morning, or that the child won't die from that cut. This shows that there 
are two competing notions of 'what is said'. One is the minimalist notion — that which 
is standardly appealed to in semantics. The other is the notion we need to capture the 
input to the Gricean reasoning — 'what is said' as opposed to what is implied by saying 
it. That notion of what is said is non-minimalist. 
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The Availability Principle 
 
There is a further difference between the two notions of what is said. What is said in the 
maximalist sense corresponds to the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance, that is, 
to the content of the statement as the participants in the conversation themselves would 
gloss it. In contrast, the literal truth-conditions posited as part of the minimalist analysis 
turn out to be (often) very different from the intuitive truth-conditions which untutored 
conversational participants would ascribe to the utterance.  
  According to Maximalism, it is a fact that what is said, qua input to secondary 
processes, is consciously available. In typical cases of implicature, the participants in 
the conversational process are aware of what is said, of what is implied by saying it, 
and they are capable of working out the connection between them. That fact is easy to 
account for if one accepts what we may call the Pragmatic View: the view that 'saying' 
is a variety of nonnatural meaning in Grice's sense (Grice 1957, 1989). That view 
entails that what is said must be available — it must be open to public view. (That is so 
because nonnatural meaning is essentially a matter of intention-recognition.) Hence my 
'Availability Principle', according to which 'what is said' must be analysed in 
conformity to the intuitions shared by those who fully understand the utterance — 
typically the speaker and the hearer, in a normal conversational setting. This in turn 
supports the claim that the optional elements I mentioned above (e.g. the reference to a 
particular time in 'I've had breakfast') are indeed constitutive of what is said, despite 
their optional character. For if we substract those elements, the resulting proposition no 
longer corresponds to the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance. 
 
 8 III. The syncretic view 
 
The four-level picture 
 
The conflict between Minimalism and Maximalism is not irreducible. An intermediate 
position is available, according to which there are two equally legitimate notions of 
what is said: a purely semantic, minimalist notion, and a pragmatic notion ('what is 
stated' as opposed to what is implied). If we accept this suggestion, we end up with four 
levels instead of three: 
 
literal   • Sentence meaning (character) 
meaning   • what is saidmin 
vs. 
speaker's   • what is saidmax 
meaning   • what is implicated 
 
 Such a compromise would seem to be acceptable to both the minimalist and the 
maximalist. The minimalist wants to isolate a purely semantic notion of content, that is, 
a notion of the content of a sentence (with respect to a context) which is 
compositionally determined and takes pragmatic elements on board only when this is 
necessary. The maximalist wants to capture the intuitive notion of 'what is said' (as 
opposed to what is implied) and stresses that what is said in that sense is, to a large 
extent, determined in a top down manner by the context. The two notions can be 
integrated within a unified framework if one accepts to replace the traditional triad by a 
four-level picture. 
 
Salmon and Bach on what is said 
 
In 'The Pragmatic Fallacy', Nathan Salmon distinguishes two senses of the phrase 'what 
is said': what is said in the strict and philosophical sense (the semantic content of the 
 9 sentence, with respect to the context at hand) and what is said in the loose and popular 
sense (the content of the speaker's speech act). What is said in the loose and popular 
sense is typically richer than the sentence's semantic content, yet it does not encompass 
what the speaker merely conveys or implicates in Grice's sense. Salmon, in effect, 
draws a threefold distinction between (i) what is said in the minimalist sense (the 
semantic content of the sentence, in the speaker's context), (ii) what the speaker asserts, 
and (iii) what he or she implies. When the conventional meaning of the sentence-type is 
added, this yields something very much like the four-level picture above. 
 Kent Bach defends a similar view, with one more level (Bach 1994a, 1994b). 
'What is said' is so minimal, in Bach's conception, that it need not even be 
propositional. It may be a 'propositional radical'. Thus if I say 'Tipper is ready' what I 
say is that Tipper is ready. This becomes a full-fledged proposition only if an answer is 
provided to the question: ready for what? A pragmatic process of 'completion' must 
therefore take place to make the Bachian 'what is said' into a complete proposition. To 
go from that proposition (resulting from completion) to what is actually asserted a 
further pragmatic process of expansion often comes into play. That process is clearly 
non-minimalist: it is neither triggered by a linguistic constituent, nor necessary in order 
to achieve propositionality. So in Bach's framework there are five distinct notions: the 
sentence's linguistic meaning; what is said in the less-than-minimal sense; the minimal 
proposition resulting from completion; the non-minimal proposition resulting from 
expansion; and, finally, the conversational implicatures of the utterance (not to mention 
what the speaker nonliteraly communicates). The contextual components of meaning 
generated through completion and expansion are called by Bach 'conversational 
implicitures' because they are 'implicit in' what is said, in contrast to the implicatures 
which are 'implied by' the what is said (or the saying of it). 
 Whatever we think of the details of Bach's and Salmon's views, it is clear that, 
by freeing us of the limitations of the traditional three-level picture, they make a 
reconciliation of Minimalism and Maximalism possible. One can be a minimalist with 
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when it comes to what the speaker asserts. 
 
Trouble with the syncretic view 
 
The syncretic view promises to give us the best of both worlds. It is attractive and 
sounds reasonable. As Jonathan Berg pointed out, I myself have proposed something 
along similar lines (Berg 1998: 466-7). Yet I think one must be cautious in one's 
advocacy of that view. 
 The weak point in the syncretic view is the very notion of 'what is said in the 
strict and literal sense', i.e. the minimalist notion of what is said. How are we to 
understand that notion? A natural and widespread interpretation runs as follows: 'What 
is said' in the minimalist sense is what the sentence says (with respect to the context at 
hand), as opposed to what the speaker says by uttering the sentence. This construal is 
quite explicit in Salmon's paper. Thus interpreted, however,  the syncretic view is 
closely related to a traditional way of construing the semantics/pragmatics distinction 
which I think must be rejected. In the next two parts of this paper, I will spell out that 
conception and show what is wrong with it. 
 
IV. Semantics and pragmatics: the standard picture 
 
Two kinds of interpretation 
 
On the standard picture, knowing a language is like knowing a theory by means of 
which one can deductively establish the truth-conditions of (or the proposition 
expressed by) sentences which one has never encountered before. Semantic 
interpretation is the process whereby an interpreter exploits his or her knowledge of a 
language, say L, to assign to an arbitrary sentence of L its truth-conditions. 
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language per se, but with human action. When someone acts, there is a reason why he 
does what he does. To provide an interpretation for the action is to find that reason, that 
is, to ascribe the agent a particular intention in terms of which we can make sense of the 
action. 
 Pragmatic interpretation is possible only if we presuppose that the agent is 
rational. That presupposition is encapsulated in the very notion of an action. To 
interpret an action, we have to make hypotheses concerning the agent's beliefs and 
desires; hypotheses in virtue of which it can be deemed rational for the agent to behave 
as she does. 
 A distinguishing characteristic of pragmatic interpretation is its defeasability. 
The best explanation we can offer for an action given the available evidence may be 
revised in the light of new evidence. Even if an excellent explanation is available, it can 
always be overriden if enough new evidence is adduced to account for the subject's 
behaviour. It follows that any piece of evidence may turn out to be relevant for the 
interpretation of an action. In other words, there is no limit to the amount of contextual 
information that can affect pragmatic interpretation. 
 
Pragmatic interpretation of linguistic behaviour 
 
A particular class of human actions is that of communicative actions. That class is 
defined by the fact that the intention underlying the action is a communicative intention 
— an intention such that (arguably) its recognition by the addressee is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for its fulfilment. To communicate that p is therefore to act in such 
a way that the addressee will explain one's action by ascribing to the agent the intention 
to communicate that p. For communication to succeed, the addressee must not only 
understand that the agent does what he does in order to communicate something to her; 
she must also understand what the agent tries to communicate. To secure that effect the 
communicator will do something which will evoke in the adressee's mind that which he 
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symbols, that is, conventional signs. It is, of course, symbols that are used when the 
communicator and the addressee share a common language. 
 At this point semantic interpretation and pragmatic interpretation make contact 
with each other. A speech act is an action performed by uttering a sentence in some 
language, say L. Let us assume that the sentence has a certain semantic interpretation in 
L: it means that p. Since the speaker utters a sentence which means that p and manifests 
the intention to communicate something to the hearer, one reasonable hypothesis is that 
he intends to communicate that p. If that is the best explanation for the action given the 
available evidence, the hearer will settle for it and (if that was indeed the speaker's 
intention) the communicative intention will be fulfilled: the speaker will have 
succeedeed in communicating that p to the hearer. In this case the speech act will be 
assigned a particular content as a result of pragmatic interpretation; and that content 
will coincide with the content which comes to be assigned to the sentence as a result of 
semantic interpretation. That is not really a coincidence, of course; for the semantic 
interpretation of the sentence was part of the evidence used in pragmatically 
determining the content of the speech act. But there are cases in which the two contents 
do not coincide: the sentence means that p, but that is not what the speaker means — 
what he manifestly intends to communicate. 
 
Two notions of what is said 
 
So far I have expounded the standard picture of the relation between semantic and 
pragmatic interpretation. I will criticize it shortly (Part V). Before doing so, let me spell 
out the connection between that picture and the syncretic view talked about in the third 
part of this paper. 
 On the standard picture, as we have just seen, there is a basic distinction 
between what the sentence says and what the speaker means, even when they coincide. 
What the sentence says is determined by semantic interpretation, that is, deductively 
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needs to make sure that the speaker utters what he does as a sentence of L; and that 
may require a good deal of pragmatic interpretation. But once it is determined that the 
utterance at issue counts as an utterance of a particular sentence of L, semantic 
interpretation takes over, and the content of that sentence is mechanically 
determined.— On the other hand what the speaker means is determined by pragmatic 
interpretation. It relies on a general assessment of the speaker's beliefs and desires, 
given an overall assumption of rationality. As I pointed out any piece of contextual 
information may turn out to be relevant to establishing the correct interpretation for the 
speech act. 
 In this framework there is room for the notion of what the speaker says — what 
is said in the pragmatic sense, or, as Bach puts it, 'what is stated'. Sometimes we can 
distinguish two components within what the speaker means: what he states, and what he 
implies in virtue of stating it. What is stated may, but need not, be identical to what the 
sentence says. Often what is stated is richer than what the sentence says, as we have 
seen. Be that as it may, there are two notions of what is said: one is the output of 
semantic interpretation. It is what the sentence says. The other is a particular aspect of 
speaker's meaning. It is what the speaker states. That distinction is the core of the 
syncretic view. 
 
V. Semantic indeterminacy 
 
Wide and narrow context 
 
I think there is something deeply wrong with the standard picture (and the syncretic 
view insofar as it is based on it). What is wrong is the assumption that semantic 
interpretation can deliver something as determinate as a complete proposition. On my 
view semantic interpretation, characterized by its deductive character, does not deliver 
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to use Russell's phrase. 
 By saying that semantic interpretation properly conceived delivers only 
schemata, not complete propositions, I do not mean that it delivers only characters in 
Kaplan's sense (Kaplan 1989). When a sentence contains an indexical, like 'I' or 
'tomorrow', the meaning of the indexical (its character) contextually determines its 
content in a very straightforward manner. There is no reason not to consider that aspect 
of content-determination as part of semantic interpretation. For the type of context-
dependence exhibited by (pure) indexicals has nothing to do with the radical form of 
context-dependence which affects speaker's meaning. The hallmark of the more radical 
form of context-dependence is the fact that any piece of contextual information may be 
relevant. But the context that comes into play in the semantic interpretation of 
indexicals is not the total pragmatic context; it is a very limited context which contains 
only a few aspects of the pragmatic context: who speaks, when, where, and so forth. As 
Bach puts it, 
 
There are two quite different sorts of context, and each plays quite a different role. 
Wide context concerns any contextual information relevant to determining the 
speaker's intention and to the successful and felicitous performance of the speech 
act... Narrow context concerns information specifically relevant to determining the 
semantic values of [indexicals]... Narrow context is semantic, wide context 
pragmatic.
i
  
 
 But most context-sensitive expressions are semantically indeteminate rather 
than indexical in the strict sense. A possessive phrase such as 'John's car' in example (3) 
above means something like the car that bears relation R to John, where R is a free 
variable. The free variable must be contextually assigned a particular value; but that 
value is not determined by a rule and it is not a function of a particular aspect of the 
narrow context. What a given occurrence of the phrase 'John's car' means ultimately 
depends upon what the speaker who utters it means. It therefore depends upon the wide 
context. That is true of all semantically indeterminate expressions: their semantic value 
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it varies not as a function of some objective feature of the narrow context but as a 
function of what the speaker means. It follows that semantic interpretation by itself 
cannot determine what is said by a sentence containing such an expression: for the 
semantic value of the expression — its own contribution to what is said — is a matter 
of speaker's meaning, and can only be determined by pragmatic interpretation. 
 
Indexicals and semantic indeterminacy 
 
Even  if we restrict our attention to expressions traditionally classified as indexicals, 
we see that they involve a good deal of semantic indeterminacy. This is true, in 
particular, of demonstratives. The reference of a demonstrative cannot be determined by 
a rule, like the rule that 'I' refers to the speaker. It is generally assumed that there is such 
a rule, namely the rule that the demonstrative refers to the object which happens to be 
demonstrated or which happens to be the most salient, in the context at hand. But the 
notions of 'demonstration' and 'salience' are pragmatic notions in disguise. They cannot 
be cashed out in terms merely of the narrow context. Ultimately, a demonstrative refers 
to what the speaker who uses it refers to by using it. 
 To be sure, one can make that into a semantic rule. One can say that the 
character of a demonstrative is the rule that it refers to what the speaker intends to refer 
to. As a result, one will add to the narrow context a sequence of 'speaker's intended 
referents', in such a way that the nth demonstrative in the sentence will refer to the nth 
member of the sequence. Formally that is fine, but philosophically it is clear that one is 
cheating. We pretend that we can manage with a limited, narrow notion of context of 
the sort we need for handling indexicals, while in fact we can only determine the 
speaker's intended referent (hence the semantic referent, which depends upon the 
speaker's intended referent) by resorting to pragmatic interpretation and relying on the 
wide context.
ii
 
 16  We encounter the same sort of problem even with expressions like 'here' and 
'now' which are traditionally considered as pure indexicals (rather than 
demonstratives). Their semantic value is the time or place of the context respectively. 
But what counts as the time and place of the context? How inclusive must the time or 
place in question be? It depends on what the speaker means, hence, again, on the wide 
context. We can maintain that the character of 'here' and 'now' is the rule that the 
expression refers to 'the' time or 'the' place of the context — a rule  which 
automatically determines a content, given a (narrow) context in which the time and 
place parameters are given specific values; but then we have to let a pragmatic process 
take place to fix the values in question, that is, to determine which narrow context, 
among indefinitely many candidates compatible with the facts of the utterance, serves 
as argument to the character function. On the resulting view the (narrow) context with 
respect to which an utterance is interpreted is not given, it is not determined 
automatically by objective facts like where and when the utterance takes place, but it is 
determined by the speaker's intention and the wide context. Again, we reach the 
conclusion that pragmatic interpretation has a role to play in determining the content of 
the utterance, in such a case. 
 
Semantic indeterminacy generalized 
 
To sum up, either semantic interpretation delivers something gappy, and pragmatic 
interpretation must fill the gaps until we reach a complete proposition. Or we run 
semantic interpretation only after we have used pragmatic interpretation to pre-
determine the values of semantically indeterminate expressions, which values we 
artificially feed into the narrow context. Either way, semantic interpretation by itself is 
powerless to determine what is said, when the sentence contains a semantically 
indeterminate expression. 
 Now I take it that such expressions can be found all over the place. Moreover, 
semantic indeterminacy is not limited to particular lexical items. One can follow 
 17 Waismann and argue that the satisfaction conditions of any empirical predicate are 
semantically indeterminate and subject to pragmatic interpretation. There is also 
constructional indeterminacy. For example consider something as simple as the 
Adjective+Noun construction, as in 'red pen'. What counts as a red pen? A pen that is 
red. But when does a pen count as red? That depends upon the wide context. The 
satisfaction conditions of 'red pen' can only be determined by pragmatic interpretation. 
(Of course there are default interpretations; but they can be overriden and I think that 
establishes their essentially pragmatic nature.) 
 Suppose I am right and most sentences, perhaps all, are semantically 
indeterminate. What follows? That there is no such thing as 'what the sentence says' (in 
the standard sense in which that phrase is generally used). There is a single notion of 
what is said, and that is a pragmatic notion: saying, as Grice claimed, is a variety of 
non-natural meaning, characterized by the role which the conventional meaning of the 
sentence plays in the hearer's intended recognition of the speaker's communicative 
intention. Roughly, what is said is that part of speaker's meaning which falls within the 
semantic potential of the sentence and is crucially intended to be recognized as falling 
within that potential.
iii
 
 If that is right, then we cannot sever the link between what is said and the 
speaker's publicly recognizable intentions. We cannot consider that something has been 
said, if the speech participants themselves, though they understand the utterance, are 
not aware that that has been said. This means that we must accept the Availability 
Principle and its maximalist consequences. 
 
VI. Rescuing the minimal proposition? 
 
My conclusion should not be overstated. I am not saying that the syncretic view cannot 
be made sense of, only that a particular interpretation (the standard interpretation) must 
be rejected. There is, I claimed, no purely semantic notion of 'what is said'. We can still 
define a minimal notion of what it said if we want  to, but we shall have to do it in 
 18 terms of the pragmatic notion. What is said in the minimal sense can thus be defined as 
what is said in the full-fledged, pragmatic sense minus the unarticulated constituents 
resulting from free enrichment. (That is a first approximation. The definition will have 
to be modified to take account of optional processes other than free enrichment. In 
order to get what is said in the minimal sense, we must abstract from all the aspects of 
meaning which result from optional, non-minimalist processes.) 
 That minimal notion of what is said is an abstraction with no psychological 
reality, because of the holistic nature of speaker's meaning. From a psychological point 
of view, we cannot separate those aspects of speaker's meaning which fill  gaps in the 
representation associated with the sentence as a result of purely semantic interpretation, 
and those aspects of speaker's meaning which are optional and enrich or otherwise 
modify the representation in question. They are indissociable, mutually dependent 
aspects of a single process of pragmatic interpretation. 
 In a former article I attempted to show that saturation sometimes depends upon, 
and presupposes, optional processes like free enrichment or transfer (Recanati 1995). 
The example I gave was the possessive phrase 'the lion's sword', in a context in which 
there are two available interpretations for the word 'lion', namely a literal interpretation 
in which it denotes an animal, and a nonliteral, metonymical interpretation in which 
'lion' is used to denote a warrior with a lion painted on his shield. (In the imagined 
context, there were both a real lion and a warrior with a lion painted on his shield.) 
Depending on which interpretation is given of the word 'lion' the genitive itself will be 
interpreted differently: if, as I assumed in setting up the example, the description 'the 
lion' is used to talk about the warrior, then 'the lion's sword' will be understood as 
meaning something like the sword which that warrior used during the fight. That is an 
instance of saturation: in context, we give a particular value to the free variable R 
carried by the genitive. Here a crucial aspect of the (wide) context is the nonliteral 
interpretation which is assigned to 'the lion'. If we changed the context by reverting to 
the literal interpretation of 'lion', that would affect the process of saturation by ruling 
out that interpretation of R. Another value would be assigned to R if the utterance was 
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killed the lion. 
 What is the minimal proposition expressed by the utterance, on the intended (i.e. 
nonliteral) interpretation of the lion example? To get the minimal proposition, we must 
give the word 'lion' its literal interpretation, because the nonliteral interpretation results 
from an optional, non-minimalist process; and we must assign a particular value to the 
variable R carried by the genitive. Which value? Well, the value which corresponds to 
what the speaker actually means, i.e. that which goes together with the intended 
nonliteral interpretation of 'lion'. The result is a monster: what the phrase 'the lion's 
sword' contributes to what is said in the minimalist sense is something like the sword 
which the lion (the animal) used during the fight. The minimal proposition thus 
determined is absurd and evidently corresponds to no stage in the actual process of 
understanding the utterance. 
 The minimal notion of what is said can (perhaps) still be useful for theoretical 
purposes. Let the semanticist use it if he or she wants to, provided he or she agrees that 
 
(i) the minimal proposition thus posited as the semantic content of the utterance is not 
'what the sentence says' in the objectionable sense glossed in Part IV and criticized in 
Part V. It is not autonomously determined by the rules of the language independent of 
speaker's meaning. At the same time, 
 
(ii) the minimal proposition has no psychological reality. It does not correspond to any 
stage in the process of understanding the utterance, and need not be entertained or 
represented at any point in that process. 
                                                 
*
  This is a revised and slightly expanded version of my contribution to the APA 
symposium on the semantic/pragmatic distinction (Berkeley, 2 April 1999). The 
symposium was sponsored by the Committee of International Cooperation of the APA. 
I am grateful to Jaakko Hintikka, President of the Committee, and to Georges Rey, who 
organized and chaired the session, for inviting me. Thanks are also due to my co-
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symposiasts Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Ken Taylor, and to Joseph Almog, Jonathan 
Berg, Pierre Jacob, David Kaplan, and Marco Santambrogio,  for discussions which 
had an impact on the paper. 
i
 This quotation comes from the handout of a talk on 'Semantics vs Pragmatics', 
delivered in 1996. In the published version of the paper, the passage got expanded into 
the following: 
 
"There are two sorts of contextual information, one much more restricted in scope and 
limited in role than the other. Information that plays the limited role of combining with 
linguistic information to determine content (in the sense of fixing it) is restricted to a 
short list of variables, such as the identity of the speaker and the hearer and the time and 
place of an utterance. Contextual information in the broad sense is anything that the 
hearer is to take into account to determine (in the sense of ascertain) the speaker's 
communicative intention. It is often said that what a speaker means 'depends on 
context,' is 'determined by context' or is 'a matter of context,' but this is not narrow 
context in the semantically relevant sense discussed above. When it is said that 'Context 
makes it clear that ...,' what is meant is that there are items of information that the 
hearer can reasonably suppose the speaker to have intended him to take into account to 
determine what the speaker means. In this broad, pragmatic sense, which is also 
relevant to whether the speech act is being performed successfully and felicitiously, 
context does not literally determine content." (Bach 1997: 39) 
ii
  One may acknowledge the need to appeal to the wide context in interpreting 
demonstratives while arguing that the appeal thus made is 'pre-semantic'. The speaker's 
directing intention is necessary to endow a demonstrative with a character in the first 
place, one might say. We need the wide context to fix the expression's character, but 
once the character is thus determined, through a pragmatic procedure akin to 
disambiguation, it maps the narrow context onto the proposition expressed by the 
utterance in that context. Similarly, we might say that whenever there is semantic 
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indeterminacy, some form of pragmatic disambiguation must take place before the 
process of semantic interpretation can start. — To argue in this way, it seems to me, is 
to acknowledge that semantic interpretation by itself cannot determine the content of a 
sentence containing a semantically indeterminate expression. 
iii
 Complications arise when the speaker 'does not mean what he says', as in irony. Such 
cases apparently show that what is said cannot be defined in terms of speaker's 
meaning. Faced with that problem, Grice suggests that the speaker only "makes as if to 
say" what, clearly, he does not assert. Alternatively, one may elaborate the pragmatic 
notion of what is said (characterized in terms of speaker's meaning) in such a way that 
the speaker who ironically 'says that p' really says that p. On this view, even though 
saying is a pragmatic matter (a matter of speaker's meaning), still one can say 
something without actually asserting it. The standard contrast between the semantic 
notion of saying and the pragmatic notion of asserting is replaced by a contrast between 
two pragmatic notions: the 'locutionary' notion of saying and the 'illocutionary' notion 
of asserting (Austin 1975; Recanati 1988). 
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